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CASE COMMENTS

origin, when it was used to expand liability by merely curtailing the
imputation of contributory negligence where there would not be vicarious liability, to the present, when it acts to curtail liability by
automatically imputing contributory negligence in every situation
where there would be vicarious liability. The rule has been rejected
in the situations in which it was originally applied. Diverting the
application of the rule to follow vicarious liability has only served to
decrease liability in an area where the vicarious liability rule itself
aimed for the opposite result. Recognizing this, writers have begun
to criticize the rule.
The use of the factor of "the right to control" the body or conduct of another as creating an "agency" for this purpose in relationships such as parent-and-child, husband-and-wife, and bailorand-bailee has been almost universally discarded as an outworn
anachronism contrary to justice and the requirements of modem
civilization.
It should also be discarded in master-and-servant situa37
tions.
Hopefully, this decision will lead other jurisdictions to the same conclusion.
BRucE H.

JAcKSON

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATE
ACTION DOCTRINE
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth
amendment' applies only to action by a state or an agency thereof. 2
Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, courts have
considered the amount of state action necessary to invoke the amendment.3 Mulkey v. Reitman is an example of how difficult this task
may be. The California Supreme Court held that the 1964 initiative
proceeding, entitled Proposition 14, violated the fourteenth amendment. Proposition 14 was an amendment to the state constitution,
which proclaimed the state's strict neutrality concerning discrimination in real estate. Upon approval by a majority of the electorate
37

Lessler, Imputed Negligence, 25 CoNN. BAR J. 30, 51 (1951).

1U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 5 1.
2Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
3Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 355 F.2d 718, 723 (4th Cir. 1966).

Recognition of "the true boundaries between the individual and the community is
the highest problem that thoughtful consideration of human society has to solve."
464 Cal. 2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 413 P.2d 825 (1966).
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Proposition 14 was incorporated into the California Constitution as
article I, section 26.5
In Mulkey, the plaintiff applied to rent an apartment offered to
the public by the defendant. When the plaintiff's application was
denied on the sole ground that he was a Negro, he filed suit seeking
an order restraining the defendant from further discrimination. The
trial court issued a summary judgment in favor of the defendant
based on section 26. The California Supreme Court reversed and impliedly held section 26 to be discriminatory because by repealing
prior legislation forbidding discrimination, section 26 established an
atmosphere conducive to discrimination.6 Mulkey then found affirmative state action on the theory that the electorate acts as an agent of
7
the state when it passes a law of the state in an initiative proceeding.
Mulkey is not a significant deviation from the existing state action
doctrine but merely finds state action at an earlier stage than prior
cases. In prior cases involving statutory discrimination the state action
found to be unconstitutional was in the enforcement of an existing
statute, not in the statute's adoption.8
5Cal. Const. Art. I, S 26, reads in part, "Neither the State nor any subdivision
or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right
of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his
real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or
persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses .... " This section was approved
by the electorate, 4,526,460 in favor; 2,395,747 against. Prior to the approval of
section 26, California had two broad anti-discrimination statutes: The Unruh Civil
Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code, §§ 51-52, which prohibited discrimination based on
race, religion, ancestry, or national origin in business establishments of every type;
and the Rumford Fair Housing Act, Cal. Health & Safety Code, S§ 35,700-35,744,
which prohibited discrimination in the sale or rental of any private dwelling of
more than four units.
6This is an interpretation of the implied holding in Mulkey. The court stated
"A state enactment cannot be construed for purposes of constitutional analysis
without concern for its immediate objective . . . and for its ultimate effect....
To determine the validity of the enactment in this respect it must be viewed in
light of its historical context and the conditions existing prior to its enactment."
Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d at 828. The court then pointed out that S 26 revoked
prior civil rights legislation. Id. at 829. However, the court also emphasized that
"defendants urge that section 26 accords them the right as private citizens to...
discriminate." Id. at 830.
71d. at 834. The dissent in Mulkey maintained that S 26 was not discriminatory.
"It is rather a declaration of neutrality in a relatively narrow area of human
conduct. . . "' Id. at 838. The dissent then raised the question of whether or
not the state has the right under the majority opinion to repeal legislation it has
placed on the books. Where the majority strictly applied the prohibition of the
fourteenth amendment upon a finding of discrimination and a state action, the
dissent concerned itself with the consequences of such an application.
8E.g., Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana,
373 U.S. 267 (1963); and Department of Conservation & Dev. v. Tate, 231 F.2d
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The state action doctrine of the fourteenth amendment may
conveniently be divided into two categories: those cases where the state
or an agent thereof has directly and affirmatively acted; and those
cases where the state has become significantly involved in the actions
of a private individual thus making the individual's actions those of
the state. 9 While the cases in the affirmative state action group tend
to be of a like nature, the cases in the state involvement category can
be subdivided on the basis of four situations where the discriminating
party: (1) receives some form of state financial assistance which benefits the instrumentality which discriminates; (2) leases the instrumentality of his discrimination from the state; (3) seeks judicial assistance in enforcing his discrimination; (4) appoints the state to be
trustee of his estate and requires discrimination in the administration
of the trust.
Affirmative State Action. It is well settled that a state may not act
directly nor through an agent" to deprive another of rights protected under the fourteenth amendment. 12 "At least in the area of
constitutional rights ...a state can no more delegate to its subdivisions
the power to discriminate than it can itself directly establish inequalities." 13 If one clothed with the state's power deprives another of the
guarantees of the amendment and acts in the name of and for the
state, his act is that of the state.' 4 Being clothed with state authority
is all that is necessary; whether the state has authorized the wrong
is immaterial.' 3 Thus, the actors need not be "the representatives of
615 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956). State enforcement in this
context includes not only prosecution by the state but those situations where
private individuals are precluded from acting freely because of state law or regulation proscribing their conduct, and thus they are forced to discriminate. These
situations differ markedly from Mulkey where the party discriminating is not
forced to do so, but rather acts freely and at his discretion.
9
Such a proposition is, of course, a fiction. Private discrimination, by definition,
is not discrimination by the state, and no amount of state involvement will make
a private individual's act the act of the state. The state involvement doctrine is
a judicial device whereby the action of a private individual may be treated as an
action by the state in order to invoke the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment. Because the state involvement doctrine is distinguishable from the affirmative
state action doctrine, it will be treated separately in this comment.
1OVirginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917); Singleton v. Board of Comm'rs, 356 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1966).
1lEx parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
12 The fourteenth amendment "must mean that no agency of the State, or of
the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any person
within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 347.
13Allen v. County School Bd., 207 F. Supp. 349, 354 (E.D. Va. 1962).
14Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
IsHome Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
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the State in the strict sense in which an agent is the representative
of his principal." 16
State Involvement. The antithesis of state action is discrimination
by the private citizen acting as such. There is no question under
present law about the individual's right privately to discriminate if he
so chooses. 17 But the courts are alert for significant state involvement
which will make the allegedly private citizen's discrimination violative
of the fourteenth amendment. The involvement of the state need not
be either exclusive nor direct.' "Only by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private
conduct be attributed its true significance." 19
(1) The most obvious group of state involvement cases deals with
private persons or corporations who have discriminated and the instrumentality of the discrimination has benefited from some form of
government financial assistance. Thus, a private hospital which has
participated in and has received funds from a federal aid program
may not engage in discrimination. 20 In taking this position Simkins
v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. held, "the initial question is ...
16Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932). This is one of a series of "White
Primary" cases in which it was held that the state cannot delegate state functions
to private clubs or associations which discriminate. See Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944) and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) for later but similar
holdings. The application of the principle of affirmative state action may be
found in many cases of varying fact situations. Of course, where a state passes
legislation promoting discrimination, it is clearly acting in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964). Similarly, where
a city passed a discriminatory ordinance, it does so in violation of the amendment,
for a city is, in the strict sense, the agent of the state. Peterson v. City of Greenvifle, 373 U.S. 244 (1963). A school board, an agent of the state, may not close
school doors to Negro children, Allen v. County School Bd., 207 F. Supp. 349
(E.D. Va. 1962); nor may it establish district lines for the purpose of avoiding
integration of the school system, Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal.
2d 876, 31 Cal Rptr. 606, 382 P.2d 878 (1963). Nor may a state agency discriminate
through any other scheme, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Similarly, a state
cannot delegate clearly state functions to discriminating private individuals, Department of Conservation and Dev. v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956); nor
may a private corporation which has assumed certain state functions engage in
discrimination, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
17Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966).
' 8 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
19Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
20Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). It is interesting to note that this decision, in
effect, overruled Wood v. Hogan, 215 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Va. 1963) which under
almost identical facts found that the investment of state and federal funds did not
amount to sufficient state involvement to deny the hospital its private status.
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whether the state or the federal government, or both, have become
so involved in the conduct of these otherwise private bodies that their
activities are also the activities of these governments . . . without the
private body necessarily becoming their instrumentality or their agent
in a strict sense." 21 Where there is a jointly planned and administered
project involving the city, state, and federal governments, such as
in an urban renewal program, no discrimination by a developer who
purchased one of the prepared lots will be permitted, for the "inextricably inter-mingled" public funds have created a sufficient degree
of state involvement to invoke the fourteenth amendment. 22 Because
of the involvement of federal funds in the construction of a federal
building, a labor union working on the project will not be permitted
23
to discriminate in the selection of its members.
(2) Another line of cases wherein the actions of a private citizen
are readily brought under the fourteenth amendment applies when
the private individual has leased from the state the instrumentality
used for discrimination. Thus, where a lessee leases quarters within a state
parking authority's garage,24 or within the county court house,2 5 and
proceeds to exclude Negroes, the courts have found sufficient state
involvement to make the fourteenth amendment applicable. 26
(3) Significant state involvement attaches to what would otherwise be a purely private action in the area of judicial enforcement
of private discrimination. Beginning with Shelley v. Kraemer,27 the
Supreme Court has held that a person bound by a covenant not to sell
to a Negro or other non-Caucasian may not be held liable by a court
21323 F.2d at 966.
2
"Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, 336 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1964). The court
emphasized, however, that former state ownership of land will not constitute
state involvement without something more.
23Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm, 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1963); rev'd
as moot, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965).
24
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
25Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
924 (1957). Similarly, the rental of quarters at the municipal airport, Turner
v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962), or the lease of land, Smith v. City of
Birmingham,
226 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Ala. 1963), are acts within the same theory.
26
1n arriving at their decisions, some courts have taken note of the fact that
the city has supplied the heat and water or other benefits, Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922
(5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957), or that any improvements
redound to the benefit of the lessor, Smith v. City of Birmingham, 226 F. Supp.
838 (N.D. Ala. 1963), but in view of the Supreme Court's failure to refer to such
factors in Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962), it is doubtful that they
are significant in such cases.
27334 U.S. 1 (1948); see also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
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to a co-covenantor for breach of the covenant. On the theory that the
judiciary branch of government is as much an arm of the state as the
executive or legislative branches, and keeping in mind that purely
private discrimination is permissible under the Constitution, the Supreme Court held in Barrows v. Jackson2 8 that when a court enforces
a covenant's discriminatory clause "to that extent the State would put
Thus it becomes not the ...
its sanction behind the covenant ....
[seller's] . . . voluntary choice but the State's choice that she observe
the covenant or suffer damages." 29 These cases must, at this stage, be
limited to their facts. In each case there was a willing seller, a willing
buyer, and a disgruntled beneficiary under the covenant who initiated
the action. In no case was the action between a desirous buyer and a
reluctant seller, as in Mulkey, and the Supreme Court has not addressed
itself to such litigation 3 0
(4) Another act of private discrimination which violates the fourteenth amendment is the establishment of a trust for the benefit of the
public but administered by the state, or an agency thereof. If the trust
is discriminatory, the state will be depriving the Negro of the equal
protection of the laws if it abides by the trust's provisions.31 Similarily,
28346 U.S. 249 (1952).
29346 U.S. at 254.
30A California court dealt with the situation in Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson,
204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962), in which a landlord
was attempting to evict his Negro tenant. The court held that "the defendant
should have been permitted to produce proof of the allegations of his special
defense of discrimination, which if proven would bar the court from ordering
his eviction because such state action would have been violative of both federal
and state Constitutions." Id. at 317. A review of the cases in which Shelley or
Barrows have been cited by the Supreme Court indicates a willingness to extend
the Shelley rule to such fact situations. There is language to the effect that the
state sanctions the judgments handed down by the courts, or at least, that a
judicial proceeding has state action or involvement. United States v. Williams,
341 U.S. 740 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349
U.S. 72 (1959); Railway Employee's Dep't A.F.L. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956);
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,
367 U.S. 740 (1961); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
31Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). "The
Board which operates Girard College is an agency of the State of Pennsylvania.
Therefore, even though the Board was acting as trustee, its refusal to admit...
(the applicants] . . . to the college because they were Negroes was discrimination by the State." Id. at 231. This case has a curious history. Upon remand,
the Pennsylvania Orphan's Court (the trial court in the case) substituted private
individuals as trustees to carry out the testator's intentions. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court upheld the substitution, In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391
Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958) cert. denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958). Whether or not

the court would grant certiorari today is an interesting question. Despite ex-

